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Abstract
Climate change policy, in particular in Europe, will a⁄ect the energy sector through the exposure
to massive penetration of distributed energy resources or decentralized generation into electricity
distribution and transmission grids. As the prerequisites for infrastructure regulation still prevail in
the future, the question arises whether the current regulatory model is still valid. In this paper, we
chararcterize some of the e⁄ects of climate change policy on the network tasks, assets and costs and
contrast this with the assumptions implicit or explicit in current economic network regulation. The
resulting challenge is identi￿ed as the change in the direction of higher asymmetry of information
and higher capital intensity, combined with ambiguities in terms of task separation. Methodolog-
ically, we argue that this may require a mobilization of the litterature related to delegated and
hierarchical systems, e.g. team performance, as the externalities are joint products from multiple
independent stages where individual regulation may introduce distortions. To provide guidance, we
present a model of investment provision under regulation between a distribution system operator
(DSO) and a potential investor-generation. The results from the model con￿rm the hypothesis
that network regulation should ￿nd a focal point, should integrate externalities in the performance
assessment and should avoid wide delegation of contracting-billing for climate change technologies.
Keywords: Network regulation, climate change, investments, distributed generation.
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Climate change policy in the post-Kyoto world has deep repercussions on the way we
extract, produce, transport and consume natural resources in everyday life. Achieving a
common aggregate goal by e⁄orts in multiple countries, sectors and over generations is itself
a daunting task for the world￿ s governments, doing under uncertainty about the optimal path
to achieve the target or even consensus about the strategic arbitrage between intertemporal
welfare and ￿nal environmental state is even worse. In this paper, we highlight a necessary
but not su¢ cient condition for the deployment of an e⁄ective climate change policy in
practice: the coordination of energy network regulation.
By focusing at the regulation of the network, rather than the energy or services performed
on the infrastructure, we intentionally abstract from highly relevant but methodologically
di⁄erent questions related to the demand and supply for energy, market e¢ ciency and power.
Further, the limitation to energy infrastructure regulation rather than the more general
utility regulation also excludes interesting and challenging problems occurring in countries
and jurisdictions with vertically integrated utilities, under electri￿cation or with state-owned
incumbents in generation. Finally, we primarily base the discussion on the most mature
and widespread energy infrastructure: electricity grids, with some attention also given to
gas network regulation. However, with an eye on particular the European political and
regulatory situation, we hope to show that [energy] network regulation as it is practiced
currently is not adequate to support a climate change policy, neither in terms on dominant
theoretical support, nor in terms of regulatory practice. Although our concern is based on
primarily theoretical arguments, we believe that the ￿ndings are of applied relevance as well.
The outline is as follows: First we brie￿ y resume the theoretical underpinnings of recent
past and current network regulation paradigms, reviewing also their links to the standard
"packages" frequently used in regulatory practice. Second, we contrast the "old world"
assumptions for regulation with the particular technical and economical challenges brought
by a likely implementation of climate change policy onto the electricity sector. Third, we
review the e⁄ectiveness of the models previously cited in the case of climate change, drawing
conclusions about some areas of concern. Fourth, we propose two theoretical streams of
analysis that have not received su¢ cient attention, but that may be informative to the
designers of the "new world" network regulation. Finally, we close the paper with some
3remarks about the feasibility of the changes and the seriousness of the problems identi￿ed.
1.1. Network operations in the climate change setting
There is some consensus as to the list of e⁄ects on network operations in a low-carbon
future, although the quantitative estimation of their importance still needs more precision.
Pepermans et al. (2005) list as driving forces for DG introduction ￿ exible and diversi￿ed
energy services, such as (i) standby or peak use capacity (peak shaving), (ii) reliability and
power quality, (iii) substitute for investments in grid expansion, (iv) ancillary services, and
environmental concerns, i.e. (v) cogeneration CHP, and (vi) e¢ cient use of inexpensive1
energy resources. The policy issues are summarized as (i) high ￿nancial cost, (ii) limited
choices of primary fuels, (iii) lower economic e¢ ciency (primarily allocative e¢ ciency),
(iv) ine¢ cient fuel utilization from an environmental viewpoint, (v) lower supply security,
(vi) mixed power quality (system frequency, voltage level, change in power ￿ ow, reduced
e⁄ectiveness of protection equipment, reactive power, power conditioning).
The reduction of carbon emissions is result of three complementary actions on the supply
side: changes in fuel mix, shifts in generation technology and carbon capture and storage
(CCS). We leave the latter part until the last section, thus addressing the decarbonization
of the electricity sector through fuel and technology mix. The fuel choices are to be guided
through an appropriate implementation of pricing mechanisms for the externalities related to
CO2-emissions, such as ETS or equivalent, which lie beyond the scope of network regulation.
The electricity generation park is planned to be extended substantially with renewable energy
resources (RES), primarily wind, tidal power, biomass and photovoltaic (PV) generation,
cf. EC (2007, 2009). The greatest absolute and relative increase among RES is found
for windpower from 82 TWh produced in 2006 to 545 TWh planned2 in 2020 EC(2007).
The new RES will be smaller units than the current centralized plants as a consequence
of exhausted locations, local NIMBY resistance, diminishing returns in resource availability
and lower economies of scale for certain technologies. In particular for wind and solar, the
lion￿ s part of the increase will be made as distributed generation (DG), i.e. installations
1 Note that the energy sources often are free (solar energy, tidal, wind) or even negatively priced (waste,
industrial heat).
2 Green-X model, least cost scenario in EC(2007).
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with the exception of Spain and Portugal, the installations are residential micro-generators
connected directly to the low-voltage grid and used mainly for autoconsumption.
The load in the low-carbon power system is partially controlled by demand-side manage-
ment (DSM) mechanisms that control interruptible loads, schedule consumption and charge
local energy storages (vehicles, heat storage) with respect to local DG availability, real-time
price signals from the retailers/DSO and local demand signals. In combination with energy
e¢ ciency applied to both residential, commercial and industrial load, the overall energy
volume transported per customer is expected to decrease. However, with continued expan-
sion of total power for household and commercial appliances, the peak load is likely not
decreasing, or at least less than the total energy consumption.
In combination with the high increase in intermittent DER generation needing backup
through generation or grid interconnection, the increased share of non-coincidental peak
generation and the introduction of wide demand-side participation also in generation and
power services, the network investment need is substantial,
The new RES Directive (EC 2009/29) explicitly stipulates (art 16:3 and 5) that electricity
TSO and DSO are obliged to disclose cost and bene￿t analyses with respect to the connection
of RES and that the residual costs are either shared among grid users (art 6) with respect to
a objective, transparent and nondiscriminatory criteria (without stating those), or absorbed
by the network operator (art 4).
2. NETWORK REGULATION IN THE OLD WORLD
The guiding principle for all economic activity in the Western society is the market.
Network operations, such as distribution of electricity or gas, are examples of natural mo-
nopolies or market failures. For electricity distribution, the monopoly is accentuated by (i)
the existence of a single supplier of the service for each customer, (ii) no substitute for the
o⁄ered service and very low price elasticity, and (iii) high economic and legal barriers to
market entry due to the asset-speci￿city and its essential importance for societal welfare.
Without non-discriminatory access to the infrastructure, the operator￿ s potential rent ex-
traction could distort incentives for generator investments, retail competition and market
e¢ ciency, leading to losses in allocative e¢ ciency. Without vertical separation, the network
5
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cess to information and infrastructure, but potentially also cross-subsidizing the competitive
business by the monopoly operations.
In addition to the desire to incite productive and allocative e¢ ciency, there are also
non-economic reasons to impose regulation on a network industry. Attention paid to public
safety, continuity of supply, public service obligations, national independence and informa-
tion disclosure and integrity are examples of such objectives.
Thus, in return for granting exclusive monopoly rights, for a limited or unlimited period
of time, the society empowers a regulator to act as a proxy purchaser of the service, imposing
constraints on the revenues, prices and/or the modalities of the production.
Early regulatory theory largely ignored incentive and information issues, heavily drawing
on conventional wisdom and industry studies. The kind of institutional regulatory economics
that Bonbright (1962) and Philips (1969) represented was challenged already in the seventies
with economists as Friedman, Baumol, Demsetz (1968) and Williamson (1976) questioning
the organization and succession of natural monopolies. However, the main breakthrough
came in the late eighties with information economics and agency theory (Holmstr￿m, Laf-
font, Tirole). An authoritative reading in the area is La⁄ont and Tirole (1993). Contem-
porary economic theory pursues the private goals and strategic behavior of the individual
agent, with particular emphasis at the access, cost and use of information. The practical
applications from this stream of research have had a profound impact on modern markets,
market instruments, contracts and economic restructuring. An interesting tendency in the
discussion of the challenges facing infrastructure is to revert to non-market solutions (feed-in
tari⁄s, priority dispatch, investment subsidies, connection privileges etc) to accelerate or,
in general, implement low-carbon technologies. As we will argue, in agreement with Pollitt
(2009), these "intuitive" solutions are not only philosophically inconsistent with the market
paradigm, they also increase complexity for actors, regulatory uncertainty and sometimes
imply distortions on both allocative and technical e¢ ciency. The current regulatory "pack-
age" in Europe is then constituted primarily of periodically reviewed high-powered regimes
with partial performance assessment (mainly cost e¢ ciency), rules for modus operandi (non-
discrimination in access etc) and a set of institutional guidelines with respect to the informa-
tion disclosure, organization and ownership of the regulated ￿rms. Its e⁄ectiveness depends
on the tasks and externalities it is supposed to control, past performance is only represen-
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2.1. Information access, task separability, independence and externalities
The properties of high-powered (incentive) network regulation depend on a number of
factors, most importantly the asymmetry on cost information, task separability, role of
independence and externalities.
Given that the demand for network connection is virtually inelastic, at least for electricity,
the natural orientation of the regulatory policy since deregulation has been to induce cost
e¢ ciency to limit monopoly rents from the DSOs. For TSOs, the task scope already included
a number of elements with high externalities and cascade e⁄ects on welfare, such as the
investments in market facilitation and security of supply in general, prompting the regulators
to impose relatively low-powered initial regimes for CAPEX and OPEX (Moens, 2009).
First, the cost information in a yardstick regime is related to access to a reference set
of cost observations for structurally comparable operators (Agrell et al., 2005). For DSO,
this condition is largely met in jurisdictions such as Germany (Agrell and Bogetoft, 2007),
or Scandinavia (Cf. NEMESYS, 2005) where data standardization and collection permit
the use of econometric non-parametric models to calculate e¢ cient costs with relatively
high precision. For jurisdictions with a smaller number of operators, international datasets
may potentially be used after correcting for cost and operating di⁄erences. However, the
assumption of comparability relies on the previous assumption that tasks and cost drivers are
uniformly applied across units, which limits the use of international data in an uncoordinated
future.
Second, the current regulatory paradigm relies on high task separability between regulated
segments. In the pre-Kyoto world of central generation and loosely interconnected systems,
primarily for the purpose of supply security, the main network services are characterized
by relatively high separability between the two vertical segments under regulation in the
EU framework: distribution and transmission. The transmission system operator (TSO)
is distinguished from the distributors (DSO) both in terms of scope of task (power system
responsability vs local supply services), but also in terms of asset base (normally 220-380
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retail operations, constitute mainly of radial passive networks with exogenously given feed-in
points (substations from TSO). As will be discussed below, there is a certain concensus that
the tasks related to transition towards low-carbon technologies will challenge this separability
in that DSOs will be forced to replicate TSO-type tasks at lower grid levels, becoming
active grid units with sophisticated local information systems and potentially even localized
price information. Another challenge for task separability is the necessity to coordinate
technical research and development activities in order to achieve e⁄ective and interoperable
solutions to attract investments at the generation stage. Although assigned as an explict
responsability for the TSOs (ENTSO-E tasks, Art 8 § 3a and § 5, EC 714/2009), we note
that both regulators (OFGEM and NMa/EK) as well as DSO associations (Eurelectric) are
implementing support schemes for DSO R&D.
Third, independence has been implemented primarily through unbundling of accounts
for DSO, ownership unbundling only for TSOs to counter market power in generation. In
the pre-Kyoto world, this could be a su¢ cently e⁄ective arrangement, since the unbundling
guarantees information access for the DSO regulation and safeguards the central generation
market, both corresponding to regulatory means to achieve welfare goals. Once again,
the massive increase of decentralized generation, demand side management measures and
more information intensive use of the distribution neworks changes the prerequisites for the
analysis. Owners of DSO may now become major players in the growing renewables segment,
with superior information about the bene￿ts and costs of using the network, raising concerns
about the objectivity of e.g. localized connection charges and equal access. This paper will
explicitly investigate this issue with respect to investment incentives, but we will ignore the
subsequent question on how market power in the DG retail market might be exercised.
Fourth, the externalities in the "old" world were mainly related to the TSO operations,
both in terms of market functioning and environmental impact. The new situation, foresee-
ing wide integration of generation and load control in distribution will put the environmental
externalities (CO2, space, noice, heat) in the focus of the DSO. Without adequate means of
internalizing part of these externalities, it is clear that the DSO will be lukewarm concerning
3 The Scandinavian introduction of a third regulated level, the regional transmission operator (RTO) oper-
ating primarily transport services at 110-220 kV is unique.
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2.2. Innovation and development activities
The radical change of the role, technology and business models for generation, distribu-
tion, transmission and load control is prompting for more than incremental development, if
the tight timeframe is to be respected step-changes are likely to be necessary. However, The
reduction of industry-￿nanced R&D since the unbundling of network services and generation
is signi￿cant with very few exceptions. Sterlacchini (2010) show that the R&D intensity in
the sector worldwide decreased by 44% in proportion to sales (26% in absolute terms) during
the period 2000 - 2007. For Europe, the ￿gures are even more negative, -49% (R&D/sales)
for all ￿rms and -67% (R&D/sales) for a sample of the four largest private European ￿rms
(Enel, EDF, RWE, and Suez). However, only two countries in Europe provided explicit in-
novation or research incentives for DSOs in 2008 (Cossent et al., 2009). Jamasb and Pollitt
(2008) provide a systemic analysis of the decline in research expenditure and ￿nds it consis-
tent with predictions taking into account privatization e⁄ects, competition and regulatory
focus on cost e¢ ciency. Although they note an increase in R&D productivity, they warn
about the long-term consequences from the reduced overall R&D intensity.
As mentioned above, the European Commission has taken the lag in R&D intensity se-
riously enough to create a "regulatory push" through the ENTSO-E obligation to perform
certain research and the provision to pass-through the related costs. However, given the
economies of scale involved in the system R&D concerned and the importance of creating
open standards and protocols for the technologies involved in the climate change energy sec-
tor, the provision relies also on the regulatory counterpart, the Agency for the Cooperation
of Energy Regulators4 (ACER), being able to monitor and incite e⁄ective and e¢ cient use of
the raised funds. It is puzzling that the previous R&D output was translated in such meager
productivity improvements prior to deregulation, serving also as reminder to question the
relationship between R&D expenditure and technological progress.
4 Cf. Regulation EC 713/2009 of 13 July 2009.
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MATE CHANGE POLICY
Brunekreeft and Ehlers (2005) adress speci￿cally the problem whether the unbundling of
DSO changes the incentives for DG integration. One of their contributions is to introduce
the temporal (short-run vs. long-run) perspective, questioning whether the DSOs are likely
to experience reductions in network losses, as opposed to TSOs. Arguing that even high-
powered regimes such as price- and revenue-caps for DSO in reality are regularly reset based
partially on CAPEX estimates, the authors conclude that the DSO unbundling and incentive
regulation are likely both to distort the timing, volume and types of DG investments made
by DSOs. The results are compared to actual investment intensity among DSOs and the
slow response to coordinated incentives DG-DSO.
Pollitt (2008) discusses the prospects for future network regulation, based on an ex post
analysis of the UK regulatory development. Noting that most investments at both the
electricity DSO and TSO level are driven by RES support schemes (such as Renewables
Obligation Certi￿cates, ROC, and the Transmission Investment for Renewable Generation,
TIRG), Pollitt foresees general increases in electricity prices of about 10-15%. For the UK,
the Stern review foresees a total investment need of 1% of GDP to meet carbon emission
targets by 2050, thereof around 4,000 MGBP for the electricity sector resulting in a 80%
reduction of the CO2 emissions by 2050. The establishment of the O¢ ce of Climate Change
(OCC) in the UK must be seen as a rare and welcome sign of committment from the
political principals with respect to the climate change target policy, following a period of high
uncertainty and slow progress from a very low level of RES penetration. In his prospective
analysis of the requirements for new network regulation, Pollitt highlights four points: (1)
maintenance of the key learnings from the liberalized energy market, (2) increased process
focus in regulation, lower emphasis on enduser prices as indicator of regulatory e⁄ectiveness,
(3) focus at the economic realization of climate change policy measures, such as interventions,
pilot projects and support schemes, (4) e⁄ective mangement of regulatory and market risk
through more sophisticated risk transfer instruments. Speci￿cally, Pollitt outlines a new
regulatory model with three elements:
First, delegation of investment decisions to negotiated settlements between grid operators
and users. This change in the direction of output-based regulation transforms the relation-
10
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ex post auditing. Positive experiences within OFGEM for gas distribution prices and a series
of international experiences analyzed by Littlechild (e.g Littlechild, 2002 and Littlechild and
Skerk, 2008) using negotiated access prices, investment decisions and quality norms support
this argument.
Second, more extensive promotion of competition on the grid and for its expansion (ten-
dered expansion). By carefully reviewing explicit and implicit barriers to entry as well as
strengthen the ownership unbundling requirements down to DSO level, emerging competi-
tion may be facilited for generation, energy services and heat networks.
Third, Pollitt discusses the lead role of the regulator in the climate change setting to make
e⁄ective internalization of the CO2 externalities, such as in the case of investmen discounting
(Weitzman, 2008), essentially acting as to assure the most economic implementation of the
environmental externalities desired.
Woodman and Baker (2008) review the UK policy on DER, concluding that the current
regulatory framework has been conceived to promote competition within a given energy
resource, rather than the development of a more system response to socio-environmental
objectives that could be addressed with DER. The recommendations for regulation focus at
the removal of investment and connection barriers for DER, increased incentives for DSO
participation through higher costs for losses and some alignment mechanism for investors-
DSO investment decisions.
Green (2009) analyses the requirements for network regulation for three types of systems
(or scopes of deregulation); retail competition (as in EU), wholesale competition (as in US
and Latin America) and integrated ￿rms (potentially nationalized, e.g. the situation in
France prior to 2005). Arguing that the low-carbon policy will give rise to higher capital
expenditure per energy unit delivered, through remote locations, intermittent generation
and non-coinciding peaks in load and generation for renewables
Cossent et al. (2009) presents a thorough review of the state of actual national network
regulation of DG in Europe and proceeds to give some regulatory recommendations. The
recommendations include measures to provide economic signals for DG investors and in-
struments to be used in DSO network regulation. To provide e¢ cient investment signals,
Cossent el al. (2009) propose shallow connection charges and variable use of system (UoS)
charges that are location-dependent, technology-dependent and cost-bene￿t re￿ ective for
11
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to that of current TSO-regulation, including the strict unbundling from DGs, the recom-
mendations are stay conceptual and urge for further research and development. In terms
of network regulation, besides restating support for high-powered incentive regulation in-
cluding the use of network service targets, the authors propose the ex ante allocation of
investment budgets to DSOs with full delegation of the use of the funds. Ex post, the reg-
ulator should receive veri￿able information about whether the investment has been carried
out. The idea behind this proposal is to provide "policy push" from the regulator without
the drawback of heavy-handed involvement in ￿rm management. One of the model features
in this paper investigates this regime. To promote investments in R&D by DSOs, Cossent
et al. (2009) propose several possible means, such as activation with higher rates of return,
partial pass-through of R&D expenses and mechanisms to allow capture of e¢ ciency gains
from innovations during longer (several) regulatory periods.
Vogel (2009), analyzing the investment incentives for DG of high- and low-powered
regimes, argues for deep connection charges as to avoid distortions up- and downstreams
in the chain. However, the ￿nal conclusion is negative when taking into account monopoly
power of the DSO, asymmetric information of cost and asset utilization, as well as the in-
trinsic di¢ culty to commit to "true" high-powered regimes without glancing at the asset
base. Vogel (2009) concludes in this context that "due to technical complexity of distri-
bution grids and the manifold information asymmetries between the involved stakeholders,
a propoer design of deep charges will be very challenging to implement in to reality." The
explicit instruction in the RES Directive to use shallow costs can then be seen as a recourse
to a second-best solution in light of the problem.
Boot and van Bree (2010) reports on a wide range of policy issues related to a zero-
carbon target in 2050, among those infrastructure for electricity. The authors higlight the
investment consequence of low-carbon transitions into DSO networks that originally are
constructed as passive networks. The role of new regulation in the view of Boot and van Bree
(2010) is extended to issues such as locational pricing (also for DSO), long-term investment
provisions, metering standards and innovation support. One approach forwarded in their
report is the "negotiated settlement" proposed in Pollit (2009).
12
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We have argued, with some support from the rich litterature on network regulation for
low-carbon power systems, that the current paradigm will be partially outdated in the new
world. However, rather than arguing along the classical Williamson range of hierarchy versus
market as coordination instrument, we forward a relatively neglected stream of litterature
that could help inform the theoretical foundation for future network regulation. Departing
from the classical dyadic view of regulation as a two-party interaction (either regulator -
￿rm or government - investor), the analysis above suggests that the old vertical separations
between regulated segments, generation and load will be fuzzy and under continuous ￿re
in the future. TSOs will need to understand DSO interactions, DSOs will need to operate
local level control systems, intelligent load and distributed generation will call on both to
control supply and demand of energy. Theoretically, the increased task complexity and
asymmetry of information call for analysis of the interaction among the agents as a team
rather than individually. Setting targets collectively increases the scope and probability that
externalities can be exploited within the team, delegating the actions to the agents. Team
theory also facilitates the analysis for collusive agreements among agents at various levels,
both in terms of side-payments (market arrangements) and in terms of e⁄ort minimization.
Indeed, the analysis of the collective team may also extend beyond the conventional frame
￿rm-regulator and open interesting insights into the interaction and optimal organization of
the multi-lateral regulatory structure itself.
Adopting the idea that network regulation may need to reconsider the boundaries and
anticipate the overall e⁄ectiveness of a given policy for a societal goal, does not necessarily
imply an abandon of the market as the governing principle for the energy sector also in the
future. However, it does suggest that the organization and delegation of tasks to speci￿c
agents may be as important as the upfront monetary incentives o⁄ered to the agents them-
selves. This perspective is not very represented in the litterature, with a notable exception
of Joskow and Tirole (2005)
The rest of this paper contributes to the analysis of the future network regulation by
deploying a simple, stylized model of joint investment under asymmetric information to
explore the policy proposals forwarded with various arguments above. Jelovac and Macho-
Stradler (2002) uses a more general formulation (of the complementary case) below. They
13
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being generated, and worked with complements in the sense that the probability function is
increasing, concave and with positive cross derivates. In the model below, ￿rst developed in
Agrell and Bogetoft (2006), we assume discrete investments and focus at the two extreme
cases of perfect substitutes or complements. A variant of the model adjusted to the setting
of decentralized health care provision is found in Bogetoft and Mikkers (2008).
5. MODEL
We present a formal model, drawing on the DER-DSO model in Agrell and Bogetoft
(2006), to investigate three prevalent scenarios; the full DSO-DER integration, a decentral-
ized DSO scenario and centralized scenario with parallel regulation of both DSO and DER
investments (cf. Fig 1). For each scenario, we determine optimal investment policies for the
DSO and DER owner under regulatory control or incentives. The evaluation criterion is the
generated welfare e⁄ects, measured as the proportion of socially pro￿table investments that
are undertaken.
The ￿rst scenario, corresponding to a situation where the unbundling requirement on the
DSO is relaxed, shows the highest investment rates. The DSO internalizes the investment
and the loss of investment is due to rationing by the regulator due to information problems.
The second scenario simpli￿es the regulation by delegation to the DSO to handle DER
issues, but the results are characterized by lower investments and some distortions in the
providership. Hence, the simplicity comes at a cost in this sense.
The third scenario provides the regulator with the added opportunity to contract sep-
arately with both the DSO and the DER. This arrangement brings several advantages for
the investment incentives to limit costs, but it is shown that the relative pro￿tability of
investments at the two levels will crucially depend on the structure of this regulation, e.g.
the role of the DER ￿ bid￿in the regulation and the DSO right to initiate investments.
5.1. Investment decision
We consider a simple case with one regulator, one distribution system operator (DSO)
and one investor-generator in decentralized generation or distributed energy resources (called
14
Per J. Agrell and Peter BogetoftFIG. 1: Model and scenario structure: DSO and DER investments.
DER below). To simplify, we study an investment opportunity assumed to be unique and
indivisible, e.g. the initial investment in a technology, measurement equipment or protective
device. The DSO and the DER can both achieve the e⁄ects of the investment, the costs of
which are private information to the DSO and DER respectively. The investments are either
substitutes or complements. One interpretation coincides with the focus in Brunekreeft and
Ehlers (2005) on distribution capacity deferral, likely to be the most important direct e⁄ect
(Pepermans et al., 2005). We shall now formalize in the simplest possible way without losing
key properties of the situations or the solution.
5.2. Regulator
The aim of the regulator is to maximize social welfare. In a situation where a new
socially desirable investments are possible at the DER and DSO levels, respectively, we may
assume that the extra value generated if these investments are undertaken is V > 0. This
social value is known and veri￿able, to abstract from the moral hazard problem of ful￿lling
investment obligations. If the regulator ￿as a representative for the consumers ￿has to
pay a total transfer T as compensation to the DSO and/or the DER, e.g. by increasing
the reimbursement (revenue-cap etc) or by direct investment subsidies, the social welfare
15
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W = V ￿ T
The objective of the regulator is to maximize the expected value of W.
Note that it follows from the postulated objective of the regulator that he explicitly
trades o⁄ the bene￿t derived from the costs of ensuring these. For su¢ ciently high values
of V , however, this accommodates the objective of simply minimizing the expected costs of
making the necessary DSO and DER activities. In such cases, we are close to the implicit
assumption in much regulation, namely that demand is basically given and price inelastic
and the aim is to ful￿ll demand at the least possible costs.
5.3. Network operator, DSO
The network operator (DSO) can make an investment at cost5 x > 0 that is private
information to the DSO. The DER and regulator only knows that the DSO￿ s cost ￿to make
it simple - is independent from DER￿ s cost, and that it follows a probability distribution
with density f(x) and cumulative probabilities F(x):The aim of the riskneutral DSO is to
maximize expected revenue minus costs, i.e.
E [R ￿ I (R;x)xjx]
where R is the revenue that the DSO is paid6. It may depend on his investments as
well as any other possible veri￿able information, including the DER investments. (We shall
investigate the e⁄ects of asymmetric information not only about investment costs but also
about who actually performs it in the ￿nal discussion). I(R;x) is the (binary) investment
decision of the DSO, one when investment is undertaken and value zero otherwise. Lastly,
5 Cost is here seen as the e⁄ective net real annuity of depreciation and capital cost in an e¢ cient capital
market as to avoid burdening the presentation with the consideration of the actual investment pattern,
taxation and life cycle maintenance pattern.
6 The actual reimbursement scheme for the DSO through allowed tari⁄s, recognized performance in yardstick
regimes, separate by-pass of investment costs or socialized transfers from other gridlevels (transmission)
is ignored here as only the behavioral e⁄ects are studied. Hence, we assume that the regulator enforces
the same non-discriminatory ￿nancing pattern for this particular revenue as for any other DSO revenue,
i.e. no additional distortion is introduced.
16
Per J. Agrell and Peter Bogetoftwe note that the expectation is a conditional one. It is the expected bene￿ts given the
private information about relevant investment costs.
5.4. Investor DER
We model the generator-investor (DER) in an analogous manner. The DER can invest
at a cost y > 0; which is private information for the DER. The investment cost y follows
a probability distribution with density g(y) and cumulative probabilities G(y), common
knowledge to all players. The DER maximizes expected revenue less cost, i.e.
E [S ￿ J (S;y)yjy]
where S is the revenue paid to the DER. In case of a connection charge, S will be negative,
and in case of net bene￿ts from installing the equipment, say by the private bene￿t exceeding
the installation costs, the net costs y will be negative. Denote the binary investment strategy
of the DER by the function J(:).
6. SUBSTITUTE INVESTMENTS
To simplify the exposition and since we consider services that can be provided at either
the DSO or the DER level, we will assume that the distributions of the costs x and y are
independent but identically distributed. In the case of substitute investments, the social
welfare obtained is V unless none of the DSO and DER invests, i.e. I = 0 and J = 0 then
it is normalized to zero.
Since both the DSO and the DER investor are rational, independent and pro￿t maximiz-
ing, investment will only take place if it is incentive compatible for the agents. This means
that the regulator anticipates the usual incentive compatibility constraints for the DSO and
the DER, respectively:
I (R;x) = argmax
￿
fE [R ￿ ￿xjx]g (1)
J (S;y) = argmax
￿
fE [S ￿ ￿yjy]g (2)
Thus, both agents maximize their respective information rents with respect to the regu-
lation imposed. In addition, individual rationality (IR) constraints must be ful￿lled for each
17
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agent, since participation is voluntary. The reservation utility is normalized to zero.
E [R ￿ I (R;x)xjx] ￿ 0 (3)
E [S ￿ J (S;y)yjy] ￿ 0 (4)
6.1. First-best solution
Before investigating the possible solutions under asymmetric information, we observe as
a benchmark the ￿rst-best solution. This is here de￿ned as the solution when the regulator
has perfect information about the costs of the DSO and DER, i.e., to invest i⁄
minfx;yg ￿ V
and in this case to implement the least costly investment level, i.e. if x = minfx;yg ￿ V
, the DSO invests, y = minfx;yg ￿ V , the DER invests (in cases of ties the solution can be
picked arbitrary).
The ￿rst best solution is illustrated in Figure 2 below. We see that investment takes
place at the least costly level and that we only forgo investments in the red are where no
level can make the investments at costs below the value V .
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work regulation; (i) integrated DSO-DER and centralized regulation, (ii) independent DSO
and DER under centralized regulation, (iii) unbundled DSO and DER under decentralized
regulation.
6.2. Integrated solution
Returning to the integrated scenario in Green (2009) or the US situation, we consider
a network regulation allowing the DSO to own and undertake the investment. Hence, the
regulator basically faces one entity with some unknown costs z of making the investment.
The integration is here de￿ned as the legal possibility for the DSO to undertake DER
investments, including harvesting gains from sale of energy at competitive terms. However,
since we are assuming that (i) no non-grid related operation at the DSO, (ii) no downstream
market power in the sale of energy for the DSO, the revenues resulting from the generation
itself are normalized to zero as being competitively valued at marginal cost (excluding the
grid impact that is explicitly modeled).
An integrated DSO-DER will of course make the investment at the least costly level, i.e.
z = minfx;yg
with cumulative distribution
H(z) = ProbfZ ￿ zg = 1 ￿ [1 ￿ F(z)][1 ￿ G(z)]
Since the regulator only knows H, not the speci￿c z, his best strategy is to make a take-
it or leave-it o⁄er to the DSO-DER entity, cf. Tirole(1988). This is a general result from
mechanism design that has many applications, cf. e.g. Antle, Bogetoft and Stark (1999).
Let z￿ be regulator￿ s o⁄er, the regulator￿ s expected value is
E(W) = [V ￿ z
￿]H(z
￿)
Since the ￿rst factor is the net bene￿t when investment takes place and the provider,
the DSO-DER entity, is paid z￿, and the last factor is the probability that the DSO-DER
actually accepts and implements the investment.
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Proposition 1 The optimal contract for the integrated case is found as the solution z￿ to
z￿ = V ￿ [H(z￿)=h(z￿)]
The result (see Figure 3) for the integrated case is a rationing z￿ with respect to V ,
re￿ ecting the tradeo⁄ between welfare and the information rents extracted by the DSO-
DER. By increasing z￿, the improvements are undertaken more often ￿but they are also
more costly. We see that when investments do take place, they are implemented at the
right level. The solution is attractive except that there are some social losses due to under-
investments (white area). Naturally, the share of investments rationed away is decreasing
in the societal externality V (e.g the urgency of achieving climate change objectives) and
increasing with the uncertainty related to the investment cost.
This underinvestment is a direct consequence of the mechanism to lower the information
rents that the DSO-DER entity can earn. We illustrate the rationing with two examples.
Example 2 Assuming that V = 1 and that z follows a uniform distribution on [0;1], we
get z￿ = 1 ￿ z￿=1 or equivalently, z￿ = 0:5. Hence, the regulator deliberately forgoes half
of the attractive investments in order to get the other investments at lower costs. Put more
generally, the desire to share the bene￿ts with the consumers should optimally force the
regulator to forego some otherwise attractive investments at the DSO and DER levels.
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distributed on [0;1]. The cumulative distribution of z = minfx;yg is therefore 1 ￿ (1 ￿ z)2
with density 2(1 ￿ z), such that the optimal z￿ is given by
z
￿ = V ￿ [1 ￿ (1 ￿ z
￿)2]=[2(1 ￿ z
￿)]
For V = 1 we now obtain z￿ = 0:354 as investment threshold level.
In the analysis above, we have assumed that the regulator cannot verify which of the
two investments (the DSO grid investment I or the DER site investment J) the integrated
entity undertakes - if any. If the investment type can be veri￿ed, e.g. by access to cost
accounting details, the above solution can be improved. This situation is analyzed in details
in Antle, Bogetoft and Stark (1999). Here we show than an optimal solution involves the
regulator setting two cost thresholds, x￿ and y￿, one for each of the two investments. The
payment to the DSO will then depend on which investment is undertaken: It is x￿ when
(I;J) = (1;0) and y￿ when (I;J) = (0;1) and 0 otherwise. The corresponding investment
strategy of the integrated entity will be to pick I = 1 if x￿ ￿ x ￿ y￿ ￿ y and x￿ ￿ x ￿ 0
and J = 1 if y￿ ￿ y > x￿ ￿ x and y￿ ￿ y ￿ 0, i.e. the integrated entity picks the investment
to maximize information rents (and breaks ties in favor of I here). This solution will lead
to less rationing. However, it will involve a coordination ine¢ ciency in the sense that the
investment with least costs may not be implemented. What matter is cost compared to the
thresholds. In such a ￿handicapping system￿the regulator would tend to favor investments
that he has better information about. If the expected values of x and y are the same but
the spread of the former is larger then the spread of the latter, the regulator would tend to
set x￿ < y￿ as demonstrated in Antle, Bogetoft and Stark (1999).
6.3. Unbundled DSO and DER under decentralized regulation
Assume, along the lines of the recommendations of Green (2009), Pollitt (2009), Vogel
(2008), that the DSO is unbundled from the DER investor to assure independence. Further,
along the lines of Pollitt (2009) and Green (2009), we assume that the regulator provides
a result-based target to the DSO only, subject to direct network regulation and more in-
formed agent than the regulator. The subsequent negotiation with the DER to achieve the
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the regulator incentivizes the DSO and the DSO can than decide whether to make the nec-
essary investments or to outsource it to the DER. Before analyzing this case, we note that
one can make the usual arguments for ownership unbundling (vertical separation), including
the controllability of the DSO and the possibility to motivate it via relative performance
evaluation (benchmarking) as it is the case in modern European regulation regimes based
on revenue or price caps set partially by relative performance assessments such as frontier
e¢ ciency analyses.
In this case, the regulator can consider the DSO as the single contracting partner. Much
like in the case of integrated ownership, the DSO can be characterized by its costs z of
ensuring the new services with value V . In the present case, and given the separate owner-
ship, however, the distribution of the DSOs direct or indirect cost z will re￿ ect the internal
incentive problem between the DSO and the DER. The DSO in its relation with the DER
faces the same problems as the regulator does in its relation to the DSO.
The DSO can carry out the investment himself at a cost of x. Alternatively, he can try
to outsource the investment to the DER level.
As before the optimal solution is found by backwards induction. Assume that the regula-
tor has o⁄ered z￿. Two situations can now be distinguished. In the ￿rst, the DSO has costs
x > z￿ and must therefore rely on DER to do the investment. In the second, the DSO has
costs x ￿ z￿ and can therefore make a pro￿t by doing the necessary investments itself. Still,
it may reduce costs by outsourcing if the DER has even lower costs. We shall now analyze
these cases.
The ￿rst situation where x > z￿ is the simplest one. The DSO has only one possibility,










That is, the DSO rations against the DER in same way as the regulator rations against
the DSO or the integrated DSO-DER above. Let y￿(z￿) be the solution to this problem.
The second situation where x ￿ z￿ is one in which investment is certainly going to take
place, but where the DSO can possibly improve its pro￿t margin by the outsourcing.
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max
y (z
￿ ￿ x)[1 ￿ G(y)] + (z
￿ ￿ y)[G(y)]
To see this observe that with probability [1￿G(y￿￿)] the DER will decline the investment
opportunity and the DSO will rely on its own investment. If, on the other hand, the DER
undertakes an investment, which happens with probability G(y￿￿), the DSO earns the margin
between the regulator￿ s compensation z￿ and its own compensation to the DER, y￿￿. Let
y￿￿(x;z￿) be a solution to the above problem.
Proposition 4 The optimal contract for the unbundled DSO under decentralized regulation
is to o⁄er the investment to the DER with the threshold y￿￿ set as the solution to
y
￿￿ = x ￿
G(y￿￿)
g(y￿￿)
Example 5 In the case of y uniformly distributed on [0;1] and x ￿ 2, we obtain y￿￿ = x=2.
We can now summarize the DSO strategy. For x > z￿ it outsources using y￿(z￿) and the
DER invests with probability G(y￿(z￿)). For x ￿ z￿, there is always going to be investment,
either by the DER when y ￿ y￿￿(x;z￿) or otherwise by the DSO.
From the point of view of the regulator, this means that choosing z￿ leads to DSO or
DER investment with probability F(z￿) + [1 ￿ F(z￿)]G(y￿(z￿)).
The regulator therefore chooses z￿ to solve
max
z (V ￿ z)[F(z) + [1 ￿ F(z)]G(y
￿(z))]
The solution with decentralized contracting among vertical separated DSO and DER
activities is illustrated in Figure 4 below.
We see that there is a general underinvestment as represented by the white area. Also,
we see that the DSO tends to favor its own investments compared to DER investments.
Again, this is a consequence of the rationing ￿in this case the DSO rations against possibly
less costly DER solutions to save information rents to the DER level. Again, this represents
a social loss.
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Example 6 Revisiting the previous example for uniformly distributed investment costs on
[0;1], we get that y￿(z) = z=2 and inserting this into the regulator￿ s problem, we see that she
will maximize (V ￿ z)[z + (1 ￿ z)z=2]. For V = 1, the corresponding ￿rst order condition
is a second degree polynomial, and choosing the correct root (the left one) we get z￿ =
(8 ￿
p
28)=6 ’ 0:4514. This means that the regulator￿ s trade-o⁄ between the probability of
investment and the price to pay is a⁄ected ￿it is now possible to lower the payment with less
risk of forgoing investment. Compare the Draconian rationing, z￿ = 1
2, that the regulator
would use if only the DSO was entitled to perform the investment.
The intuition is that since the DSO has the possibility to outsource the investment, the
probability distribution of the least cost alternative is having more mass on lower values than
the uniform distribution. Indeed, if only the DSO can provide the service, the probability of
acceptance using z is F(z) = z while with the DSO able to outsource also, the probability of
acceptance is [F(z￿)+[1￿F(z￿)]G(y￿(z￿))] = z +(1￿z)z
2 taking into account the optimal
response of the DSO in his outsourcing activities. The two situations are illustrated in
Figure 5 below
In the analysis above, we have assumed that the regulator cannot monitor if the invest-
ment takes place in the DSO grid or at the DER site. This is similar to our analyses of the
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Per J. Agrell and Peter BogetoftFIG. 5: Probabilities of acceptance of o⁄ers z; P(I(z)) and P(J(z)):
integrated utility. If the investment type can be observed, and if we relax the limited liabil-
ity constraint into one of expected non-negative pro￿ts, it may be possible to improve the
solution as demonstrated in Mookherjee (2006). The idea of such an improvement would be
that the regulator could subsidize or tax the outsourcing decision to avoid the bias towards
in-house investments by the DSO. Also, a penalty can be used to transfer the DSO informa-
tion rent to the consumers. The strict outsourcing requirement of connection investments
for DER to DSO grids in the Swedish network regulation is an interesting application of
how this bias is addressed by simply by-passing the DSO.
6.4. Individual centralized regulation
We now turn to an organization where the regulator centralizes the regulation to both
the DSO and the DER. There are two possible interpretations of this setting. In the ￿rst,
the regulator uses unconditional regulation in the sense that his regulation of the DSO is
independent on the reaction that his regulation has on the DER and vice versa. This is the
most obvious and probably the most natural regulation in a practical setting. It sends clear
signals to the DSO and the DER, but at the risk of double investments (e.g.both network
upgrades and the location of DER at the end of feeder line)
The second interpretation involves conditional strategies. The regulator may use one of
25
Network Regulation under Climate Policy Reviewthe parties as the default provider and the other as an optional provider. Thus, for example,
the regulator could ￿rst invite the DER to do the investment and if it declines, it could turn
to the DSO for possible investments. Clearly, the latter solution has some resemblances with
the decentralized solution above. Still, it will be di⁄erent as we shall see since the regulator
does not have the information about the DSO cost that the decentralized strategies made
used of.
The unconditional centralized solution requires the regulator to choose costs targets x￿
and y￿ that the DSO and DER, respectively, will get covered if they invest. The cost targets
are set by the regulator to solve
max
x;y (V ￿ x)F(x) + (V ￿ y)G(y) ￿ V [F(x)G(y)]
To see this, observe that the regulator expected net bene￿t is the value V net of payment
to the DSO if the DSO invests plus the net bene￿t from the DER￿ s investments minus the
value if they both invest (to balance out the double counting of values from the ￿rst two
terms).
This problem leads to ￿rst order conditions
x









We see that the ￿rst order conditions have the same general structure as earlier. The
regulator o⁄ers less than the possible value of the investment, i.e. he rations, to save in-
formation rents. In the present setting, the starting point is moreover not the value V but
rather the discounted values V [1 ￿ G(y￿)] and V [1 ￿ F(x￿)] respectively, i.e. it is only the
value V multiplied by the probability that the other level do not invest that counts. This
re￿ ects that the attainable value in this case since it is the value that is not already extracted
by the other level. This leads to a more severe under-investment to lower the costs of double
investments at low costs at both levels.
The solution is illustrated in Figure 6
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Example 7 In the case of V = 1 and uniform costs on [0;1], for example, we get x￿ =
y￿ = 1=3. Hence, the regulator rations more harshly against the DSO and DER (using 1=3
as opposed to 1=2 in the case of possible investment in one level only) to lower the cost of







The regulator will always choose to ration - if only slightly for large values of V . This
happens for the following reason: When the cost targets are getting closer to the upper limit
1, the marginal cost of rationing is declining since the forgone investments are most likely
picked up by the other level. Also, the marginal bene￿ts from rationing are increasing since
the double investment problem is high when the cost targets are high and therefore the cost
marginal saving in double investment costs is increasing for larger value of the targets. The
cost targets are illustrated in Figure 7 .
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6.5. Conditional centralized regulation
Consider next the conditional centralized solution. Let us assume that the DER is the
primary provider and that the DSO may be called upon to invest if the DER declines. The
alternative situation with the DSO being the primary and the DER the secondary provider
is similar. The conditional centralized solution requires the regulator to choose a cost target
y￿ that is o⁄ered to the DER and cost target x￿ that is o⁄ered to the DSO if the DER has
declined y￿. These targets are set to solve
max
x;y (V ￿ y)G(y) + (V ￿ x)F(x)[1 ￿ G(y)]
To see this, observe that the regulator expected net bene￿t is composed of two terms.
The ￿rst is the value V net of payment to the DER y￿ if the DER invest. This happens
with probability G(y￿). The second term is the net bene￿t if the DER declines and the DSO
accepts. This happens with probability [1 ￿ G(y￿)]F(x￿).
This problem leads to ￿rst order conditions
x









We see that the ￿rst order conditions have a structure quite similar to the previous
problems. Indeed, the optimal cost threshold for the DSO, x￿, is exactly as it would be
if the DSO were the only possible provider. This is not surprising since the DSO in our
setup is the secondary provider, i.e. x￿ is used when DER has already declined to do the
investments. In setting x￿, the regulator therefore faces the usual trade-o⁄ of lowering the
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Per J. Agrell and Peter BogetoftFIG. 8: DSO and DER investments, centralized conditional regulation, substitutes.
price when investment takes place and at the same time running the risk of no investments.
The second ￿rst order condition is also of the usual form, except that the value to be gained
is lowered by the expected gains forgone by not using the DSO as the provider. That is, the
value from having DER do the investment is reduced by the value of the option of using the
DSO as the provider.
The solution is illustrated in Figure 8 below.
Example 8 In the case of cost uniformly distributed on [0;1] and value V (at the most 2),
the optimal solutions are x￿ = V=2 and y￿ = (3=8)V:
It may seem counter intuitive that we are willing to pay more for the DSO investment that
for the identical DER investment. However, this is a consequence of the rent-saving exercise.
If the same opportunity is o⁄ered to both providers, the only role of the secondary provider
would be to increase the investment probability. In the optimal solution, the secondary
provider is also used as a competitor against the primary provider.
Proposition 9 The conditional solution is always weakly superior to the unconditional so-
lution.
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ditional case ￿it is just not optimal. The disadvantage of the conditional approach from
a practical perspective, however, is that it takes more time using a sequential two-stage
approach rather than a simply single-stage approach. Also, this would make investment
planning in the DSO more di¢ cult since it cannot plan an investment based on its own cost
alone ￿it must await the response of the DER.
The conditional approach can be re￿ned into a series of conditional o⁄er: First, DER gets
an o⁄er of a relatively low cost target. If DER declines, the DSO gets an o⁄er of a slightly
higher cost target. If it declines, a new and higher o⁄er is made to the DER and so on.
Such sequential or parallel bargaining can lower the rents to the DER and DSO levels, but
it would run into more serious practical problems of time needed and investment planning
as discussed above. For this reason, we shall not expand on it.
7. COMPLEMENTARY INVESTMENTS
In the case of complements, the welfare e⁄ect V is obtained i⁄ both agents invest, i.e.
I = 1 and J = 1; else the outcome is normalized to zero. The case could be illustrated by
the coordination of smart meters, smart grids and demand side management (DSM) for e.g.
automated load control. Installing the DSM without meters does not exploit the externalities
and the information about grid usage and real time prices, providing real-time information
about grid usage and nodal prices in distribution networks without any application is useless.
The ￿rst-best solution is simply de￿ned by the condition
x + y ￿ V
The investment outcome is illustrated in Figure 9 below, the undertaken investment is in
the dark grey area, the lighter grey area are socially costly investments that are rejected.
7.1. Integrated DSO-DER: centralized solution
If the DSO and the DER are integrated (or there is no asymmetry of information between
the two), the total cost of the integrated entity will be
z = x + y
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with cumulative distribution




As in the case of substitutes, the best strategy for the regulator is to make a take-it-or-
leave-it o⁄er to the integrated entity. If the regulator o⁄ers z￿ to the integrated entity, the
expected value for the regulator is similar to the case of substitutes
E(W) = [V ￿ z
￿]H(z
￿)
Proposition 10 The optimal regulatory contract for the integrated centralized case with
complementary investment is an o⁄er z￿ found from
z
￿ = V ￿ [H(z
￿)=h(z
￿)]
The regulator rations, i.e. he o⁄ers less the true value of the investment V . Her o⁄er
re￿ ects the trade-o⁄between lowering the information rents of the integrated entity and the
probability of not having the investment at all. The investment outcome is illustrated in
Figure 10, where the white area denotes coordination losses, i.e. socially optimal investments
that are not undertaken due to rationing.
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Example 11 For the case V = 1 and x; y following uniform distributions on [0;1], we
get H (z) = z2
2 for z ￿ 1 and H (z) = 1 ￿
(2￿z)2
2 for z in [1;2]. The optimal investment
threshold is z￿ = 2
3, i.e. investments take place only with probability 2
9 whereas 1
2 of the
investments are socially desireable. Hence, the welfare loss corresponds to 5
9 ’ 56% of the
￿rst-best investments.
7.2. Decentralized regulation
In the case of decentralized regulation, the regulator o⁄ers z￿ to the DSO for the combined
investment. If x > z￿, no investment can take place. If x ￿ z￿, the DSO can make an o⁄er
y￿ to the DER investor. With probability G(y￿), the DER will accept the o⁄er. Therefore
the DSO obtains y￿ from solving
max
y ((z
￿ ￿ x) ￿ y)G(y)
With ￿rst order condition for an inner optimum is
y
￿ = (z




Per J. Agrell and Peter BogetoftFIG. 11: DSO and DER investments, decentralized case, complements.
From the point of view of the regulator, this means that the regulator￿ s o⁄er z￿ leads to
DSO and DER investment only if both conditions x ￿ z￿ and y ￿ y￿(z￿ ￿ x) hold. The
￿rst condition is satis￿ed with probability F(z￿) and, for any given x, the second condition
is satis￿ed with probability G(y￿(z￿ ￿ x)) by the independence of x and y. Therefore, the







￿ ￿ x))f (x)dx
Proposition 12 The optimal regulatory contract for the integrated decentralized case with
complementary investments is
z
￿ = V ￿ [H(z
￿)=h(z
￿)]
The investment outcome is illustrated in Figure 11 below.
Example 13 For the case V = 1 and x; y following uniform distributions on [0;1], we get
y￿ = 1
2 (z ￿ x) and thus H (z) = z2
4 for z ￿ 1. The optimal investment threshold is z￿ = 2
3,
i.e. investments take place only with probability 1
9. The social loss corresponds to 7
9 ’ 78%
of the ￿rst-best investments.
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optimal full revelation mechanism of the Myerson (1979) type, since the competition among
the agents is not e⁄ective when the participation of both agents is necessary.
7.3. Individual centralized solution
In the individual centralized solution, the regulator makes o⁄ers x￿ for the DSO and y￿
for the DER as the solution to the problem
max
x;y f(V ￿ x ￿ y)G(y)F(x) ￿ xF(x)[1 ￿ G(y)] ￿ yG(y)[1 ￿ F(x)]g
The ￿rst term represents the gain if both the DSO and DER accept the o⁄er of the
regulator. The second term represents the loss if the DER declines and the DSO accepts.
This happens with probability [1 ￿ G(y￿)]F(x￿). The third term represents the cost if the
DER accepts and the DSO rejects the contract.
Di⁄erentiation w.r.t x￿ gives us the following ￿rst order condition
G(y
￿)[￿F(x



























Similar to the case of substitutes, the regulator rations to lower information rents, while
he rations more than in the integrated solution to lower the loss of only one party investing.
The solution can be illustrated as in Figure 12 below.
Example 14 For the case of x; y following uniform distributions on [0;1], the FOC of the
objective function are V y ￿2x and V x￿2y, respectively. Thus, for V = 1; optimal solution
is x￿ = y￿ = 0. The social loss corresponds to 100% of the ￿rst-best investments! For V = 2;
the solution is arbitrary for any x￿ = y￿ in [0;1] and for V > 2 all investments are carried
out.
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Per J. Agrell and Peter BogetoftFIG. 12: DSO and DER investments, centralized individual regulation, complements.
The intuition behind the result for the individual centralized regulation lies in the unilat-
eral commitment from the regulator to ￿nance the investment irrespective of the coordination
in the chain.
7.4. Conditional centralized solution
To illustrate the possibility to get intermediate outcomes between those of full revelation
and the individual regulation we may again consider an example of conditional regulation.
One possibility in direct line with the case of substitutes is to o⁄er the investment possibility
to the DER investor and if he accepts and undertakes the investment, to o⁄er the investment
also to the DSO. The advantage of this arrangement compared to the individual regulations
above is that we can avoid having the DSO invest without the DER investing. We can
however not avoid that the DER invests but the DSO refuses to do so as well. The outcome
following such an arrangement will therefore often be that the regulator should refrain from
any investments to begin with much like in the case of individual regulation.
To get a di⁄erent outcome, therefore, we will here assume that the regulator can make
conditional regulations in the following sense: She o⁄ers (simultaneously) a separate contract
to both the DSO and the DER. An accepted contract by one party is only valid if the other
party also accepted his contract. Therefore, in the unconditional centralized solution, the
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Network Regulation under Climate Policy ReviewFIG. 13: DSO and DER investments, centralized conditional regulation, complements.
losses due to acceptance by only one party do not occur.
The regulator therefore solves:
max
x;y fy(V ￿ x ￿ y)G(y)F(x)g
with corresponding ￿rst order conditions
x
￿ + y





￿ = V ￿
G(y￿)
g(y￿)
This solution is illustrated in Figure 13 below.
Example 15 For the case of V = 1 and x; y following uniform distributions on [0;1],
we obtain x￿ = y￿ = 1
3: Investments take place with probability 1
9 as in the decentralized
regulation. The social loss corresponds to 7
9 ’ 78% of the ￿rst-best investments.
The intuition for the equivalence between the conditional centralized regime and the de-
centralized regulation is also found more generally in Melumad et al. (1995), where delegated
contracting like our scheme replicates the second-best solution obtained through centralized
36
Per J. Agrell and Peter BogetoftTABLE I: Outcomes, uniform example, substitutes
Regulation x￿ P (I;J) E (W) Rationing Misallocation Double invest
First-best ￿ 1:000 0:667 No No No
Integrated 0:354 0:583 0:376 Yes No No
Centralized 0:500 0:750 0:417 Yes No No
Decentralized 0:451 0:575 0:316 Yes Yes No
Centralized individual 0:333 0:556 0:333 Yes No Yes
contracting. Moreover, Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1998) explore the properties of
the delegated contracting when side-payments and collusive agreements between agents are
possible. E⁄ectively, when the possibility of collusive behavior is independent of contractual
organization, the two regimes are equivalent also under moral hazard.
8. CONCLUSION
To summarize the ￿ndings, we table the outcome for the case of uniform costs [0;1] and
welfare V = 1, the situation for substitutes in Table I and for complements in Table II,
respectively.
In the case of substitutes, the centralized solution is the preferred option as it avoids
misallocations (i.e., lowest cost investment is implemented) and does not involve useless
duplicated investments. There is still losses associated with the outcome, namely due to the
rationing. Rationing in the sense that not all investments with cost below the value to the
consumers are undertaken is part of the solution since it enable the regulator acting as a
substitute consumer to lower the information rents he has to pay.
For complements, the same ￿nding as above for substitutes is relevant. A centralized
regulation can here replicate the second-best solution obtained from an integrated DSO
internalizing all e⁄ects.
If ￿for reasons that may go beyond the scope of the model ￿the two levels are separated
(unbundled), we can foresee two possible organizations of the regulation. In the ￿rst, the
regulator contracts with the DSO that has the option to outsource the investments. In the
other, the DSO and DER are contracted individually by the regulator.
37
Network Regulation under Climate Policy ReviewTABLE II: Outcomes, uniform example, complements
Regulation x￿ P (I;J) E (W) Rationing Misallocation Double invest
First-best ￿ 0:500 0:167 No No No
Integrated 0:667 0:222 0:074 Yes No No
Centralized 0:667 0:222 0:074 Yes No No
Decentralized 0:667 0:111 0:037 Yes Yes No
Centralized individual 0:000 0:000 0:000 Yes Yes Yes
The best separated outcome is the ￿rst one, i.e. it involves decentralized regulation: only
the DSO is contracted directly and the possible regulation of DER is delegated to the DSO.
The advantage of this approach of having decentralized regulation of DER is that the DSO
has private information about its own costs and that it can use this information when decid-
ing how to incentivize DER. Nevertheless, this setting leads to less overall investment ￿at a
higher cost to the consumers. Two types of ine¢ ciencies are present, namely rationing and
some misallocation of investment among the two levels. The DSO favors its own investments
since outsourcing generates costs of asymmetric information.
When the regulator contracts directly with both levels, the outcome is less e¢ cient ￿there
will be rationing and double investments, i.e. in some cases, the DER and DSO levels will
both end up investing even though this is unattractive since the investments are substitutes.
This can be partly circumvented if the regulator uses conditional regulation such that the
o⁄er to one level depends on the response of the other level. The latter however may be a
di¢ cult approach in practice since it requires time to ￿rst o⁄er the investment to a primary
provider and next to a secondary provider if the primary provider declines.
In short, therefore, from the point of view of substitute investments, the regulator will
prefer an integration of the DSO and DER activities ￿and if this is not possible, it would
prefer a regulation of one of the levels leaving the control of the other to the directly regulated
level.
Of course, this ranking of the di⁄erent organizational and regulatory solutions may con-
￿ ict with other objectives that we have ignored, including the need to incentivize cost reduc-
tions at the DSO level in general via relative performance evaluations like in a high powered
revenue cap (CPI-X) regulation.
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incentive network regulation and for the organization of network services, respectively.
First, the results show that in the presence of increased importance for discrete delegated
investments with high asymmetric information, the optimal regulation of future network
services should remain a high-powered incentive regulation ￿with an inclusion of the in-
vestment driver as part of the service description of the DSO. An example of where this is
used in yardstick design for electricity DSO is Bundesnetzagentur in Germany, cf. Agrell
and Bogetoft (2007). The DEA frontier model speci￿cation used in the regulation includes
variables for the subscribed capacity for decentralized generation into the network, divided
by voltage level, as cost drivers.
Second, the network regulation should if possible be centralized to one agent with veri-
￿able investments and no delegated or conditional rights. This means that the "negotiated
agreements" are likely not a long-term solution for the network regulation in the future.
This result can be directly compared to that of Joskow and Tirole (2005, section 5) where
the question of merchant investments in transmission can be delegated to the contracting
parties, in their case two potential investors. For both complementary and substitute in-
vestments, the authors reject the applicability of the Coasian theorem (unless mitigated by
long-term contracting) since a number of assumptions are not ful￿lled; (low) transaction
costs, complete information, presence of all stakeholders, absence of free-riding, absence of
hold-up of potential losers. In the current situation, we note that several of these conditions
are violated also in the case of the local DSO-DER bargaining. The DSO is naturally in
informational advantage, there are high transaction costs involved to adequately describe
and contract on the externalities involved on and o⁄ the grid, the future grid users are not
represented at the negotiation although likely to assume the investment if made by the DSO,
future investors in generation can free-ride on infrastructure in e.g. control equipment and
protection etc.
Finally, it should be noted that the discussion and the model is oriented to a speci￿c
policy issue: the provision of investment incentives for CAPEX increases in order to acco-
modate and fully utilize future low-carbon energy resources. This is made without neglecting
the importance of assuring the development of technologies for the future energy system,
including the potential establishment of CCS installations and networks that in themselves
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Network Regulation under Climate Policy Reviewmay give rise to questions of network regulation that do not share these properties.
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